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 Abstract 
 
The stereotype of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relations in India is that of a dominating mother-in-law 
and submissive daughter-in-law.  However, residents of low-income settlements in Chennai (formerly called 
Madras) argue that daughters-in-law no longer submit to the demands and wishes of their mothers-in-law as 
they do in rural Tamil Nadu, a South Indian state of which Chennai is the capital.   Rather than being culturally 
determined, relations between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law are shaped by shifting physical, social and 
economic dependencies and expectations of dependence in the future.  In many families  social and economic 
developments are redefining relations between older and younger generations.  Where such developments have 
had, or are expected to have, a deleterious effect on older women's capacity to support themselves or secure the 
support of their family, mothers-in-law are adopting a variety of strategies towards their daughters-in-law 
including that of appeasement. 
 
 
 Amongst Indians and the general public in the West the predominant image of 
mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relations in Indian joint families is that of the 
dominant mother-in-law and submissive daughter-in-law.  However, many residents of 
low-income settlements in Chennai (formerly called Madras) complain that in the city 
daughters-in-law do not submit to the demands and wishes of their mothers-in-law as 
they do in rural Tamil Nadu, a South Indian state of which Chennai is the capital.  
Younger women in these settlements, wishing to stress the inversion of the `typical' 
order of the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relationship, state `here it is the 
daughter-in-law who lies on the bed ordering her mother-in-law around'.  In practice 
many women in these low-income households are wary of their daughters-in-law and 
anxious not to antagonise them.  Such claims and relations not only contradict the 
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predominant image of Indian mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relations but also the 
Indianist view that relations between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law in South India 
are more equitable than in North India.  
 
 This article explores the disparities between the predominant and Indianist 
depictions and my informants' claims by examining the basis of mother-in-law and 
daughter-in-law relations amongst those living on low-incomes.  The evidence suggests 
that intra-gender, inter-generational family and household relations are not static, that 
improvements in the circumstances or opportunities of one generation in a family may 
be detrimental to another and that the quality of family and household relationships are 
based as much on expectations (including fear) of the future as on current 
circumstances.  The article shows that economic developments can have a deleterious 
effect on older women's capacity to support themselves or secure the support of their 
family.  Clearly this is not a problem confined to India, yet the consequences of 
economic development for the welfare of older generations and their relations with 
younger, related adults has failed to draw much interest from anthropologists.             
 
 Fieldwork was undertaken between November 1990 and March 1992 in two 
settlements in central Chennai: one is a squatter settlement and the other comprises a 
mixture of municipal tenements and open plots allocated by local government.  
Residents of both areas are either born in Chennai or are long term rural-urban migrants. 
 They belong to the disadvantaged castes designated by the state as the `Scheduled 
Castes' (once known as Untouchables), `Most Backward Castes' and `Backward Castes' 
(the largest castes are Adi Dravidars, also known as Paraiyars, and Vanniyars). The 
majority work in the informal sector.  
 
 The thrust of my argument is that social and economic positioning in 
conjunction with family demographics, rather than culture, has the primary role in 
shaping mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relations.  The first section of the article 
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identifies the source of the conflict between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law 
underlying the predominant view of their relations.  Amongst academics this conflict is 
considered to result from the North Indian pattern of gender and family relations.  In the 
second section I argue that the Indianist view that gender and family relations in South 
India differ from those in the north results from emphasising abstract kinship patterns at 
the expense of actual kin relations and social and economic positioning.  Section three 
examines the anxieties women in Chennai's low-income settlements have about their 
relations with their daughters-in-law and some of the strategies they use to keep 
daughters-in-law compliant.   
  
Structural conflicts and mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relations 
 The predominant view of `typical' mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relations as 
one of dominating mother-in-law and submissive daughter-in-law largely coincides with 
early studies of landed, North Indian joint families.  In the 1960s and 1970s scholars of 
North Indian joint families focused on how, when and why joint families break up.  
When they considered mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relations they were largely 
interested in how stranger brides were incorporated into the joint family and took little 
interest in the transfer of power and authority from the older woman to the younger, 
taking it to be a logical consequence of the younger woman's role as mother of the next 
generation.  Drawing on their studies and more recent work on gender and household 
relations the following picture of the North Indian, landed, joint family emerges.    
 
 The North Indian pattern of male inheritance, village and kin exogamy, virilocal 
residence, and restrictions on women's economic activities makes women dependent on 
men (Sharma 1980:200-1) and positions brides as strangers in their husband's home.  
Initially a woman's economic prospects are tied to those of her husband.  Subsequently 
they are tied to those of her sons for two reasons: first, she and her husband will become 
reliant on their sons in old age and second, by custom, a woman has no right of 
inheritance although she has a right to maintenance from her husband's estate.
1
  Thus 
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the economic interests of the older woman (and her husband) are best served by the joint 
household.  Conforming with the cultural ideal of joint families, this arrangement also 
confers prestige.   
 
 Frequently joint family interests do not coincide with the interests of individual 
sons and their conjugal families for contributions to, reliance upon and consumption of 
joint family resources are generally unequal (Parry 1979:182-192).  Unequal fertility 
rates within joint families not only result in differential consumption rates but also 
differential inheritance as joint property is not divided equally within generations.  
Instead the most widespread inheritance pattern is one where the joint property is 
inherited equally by the coparceners which in most Indian states comprise up to four 
generations, that is a man, his sons, his sons' sons and their sons living or conceived at 
the time of partitioning the property.
2
  Thus the wife who produces the most sons 
increases her family's share of  joint property.  In these circumstances the interests of 
individual sons and their families may be better served by an early partition of the joint 
household and property.  The timing of partition depends on the brothers' assessment of 
the benefits of remaining together as against their opportunities post-partition as well as 
their ability to dissuade those keenest on partition at any one time.  This is not to suggest 
that assessments are made on purely economic grounds, consideration of the social 
prestige of remaining joint and of cultural mores, such as providing the necessary 
framework for the seclusion of women, is also brought into the equation (see, for 
example, Parry 1979:173-194).  Thus in a landed joint family a bride is seen as 
potentially threatening for women and their children embody and accentuate the 
structural conflicts between the interests of joint families and their (potentially) nuclear 
family constituents; in this way wives are blamed for conflicts between brothers (Parry 
1979:173-178, 193-4; Berreman 1972:174-175; Madan 1965:169-172).   
 
 As control over the bride and management of family relations are in the mother-
in-law's hands it falls to her to ensure that her daughter-in-law does not develop the 
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confidence nor gain the loyalty of her son sufficient to encourage him to break the joint 
family.  She wears down her daughter-in-law's confidence through ridicule, rebukes, 
physical exhaustion and beatings (Jeffery et al 1989:31) and restricts the bride's access 
to the groom by determining when they will be alone together (Dandekar 1981).  This, 
in the context of arranged marriages, combined with prescriptions on their interaction, 
militates against young couples developing a close relationship (Jeffery et al 1989:28-
31; Parry 1979:176).   
 
 It is this kind of treatment which generates the stereotype of the cruel, 
dominating mother-in-law jealously protective of her preeminent position in her son's 
affections.  Commenting on popular Indian cinema, Das Gupta states: 
 In that last high status [of mother-in-law], [a woman] can revenge 
herself upon society for the destruction of her own youth by visiting it 
upon her daughter-in-law.  In so doing, she has the additional sadistic 
satisfaction of alienating her beloved son from his newly acquired wife, 
her rival for his affection.  The family's perceived economic need to 
extract more and more dowry from the bride's father sometimes leads to 
murder of the new bride with the help of the [bride's] husband giving the 
mother[-in-law] a physical thrill that may go far deeper than economic 
gain (1991:159). 
 
 While the popular stereotype suggests fixed relations between mothers-in-law 
and daughters-in-law the studies mentioned above imply (but do not explore) something 
more complex, for with the birth of children a daughter-in-law's confidence rises while 
at the same time tensions over contributions to, and distributions of, household 
resources sharpen. Not only are mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relations strained, 
reflecting the structural conflict between the landed joint family and its `nuclear' 
constituents, but rather than declining structural conflict increases with time.  
Recognising the structural positioning of mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law advances 
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our understanding of the determinants of their relations beyond the stereotype of the 
dominating mother-in-law and submissive daughter-in-law.  It reveals that rather than 
short term power struggles and the immediate problems of incorporating a stranger into 
the family, their relations entail recognising and strategising around long-term 
differential, even divergent, interests and are rooted in expectations and fears of what 
the future might hold.   
  
 As the image of the dominant mother-in-law and submissive daughter-in-law is 
rooted in the specific economic tensions found in North Indian, landed joint families it 
is unlikely that this image is generalisable to landless North Indian families as the 
crucial issue of property inheritance does not apply.   It is even questionable to what 
extent the image adequately depicts mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relations in landed 
North Indian joint families for household demographics, the participation of family 
members in non-farm work, often located in urban areas, and the size and quality of 
landholding will create variations within mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relations.  
These variations are not simply to be found between households but also within 
households.  If the objective of the mother-in-law is to retain the joint family in a 
context where sons have differential interests in doing so, mothers-in-law will adopt 
strategies according to how they read the personalities and changing circumstances of 
sons and daughters-in-law as well as changes in, and expectations of, their own and 
their husband's circumstances as they move into old age and dependency.
3
   It is in terms 
of this variation that studies focusing on the bride's or joint family perspective fail to 
problematise the process by which daughters-in-law gain power and mothers-in-law 
lose it.  More nuanced investigations are needed of mother-in-law/daughter-in-law 
relations which take a contextualised processual focus in relation to age and material 
circumstance to reveal the very complex and changing set of relationships and strategies 
on the part of mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law.  Such investigations will take us 
beyond the North Indian model's stereotyping of mother-in-law/daughter-in-law 
relations. 
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North and South Indian models 
 Until recently the anthropology of India was dominated by a framework that 
approaches cultural diversity by taking cultural units (castes, tribes, religions and races-
as-culture-bearers) as the appropriate objects of analysis.  This approach underplays 
diversity within cultural units as well as the commonalities between them.  Such a 
framework is seen in the construction of North and South Indian models of kin and 
gender relations.  Dyson and Moore (1983) provide the most explicit and influential 
comparison of these two models.  They draw a diagonal line across India from the 
Gujarat/Maharastra border to the Bihar/Orissa border approximately along the Saturpa 
hill range.  North of the line and extending into parts of the Mediterranean lies what 
they identify as the Aryan/West Asia pattern of kin and gender relations.  South of the 
line and extending to Sri Lanka and to the border of the Confucian cultures of China, 
Japan and so on is the Dravidian/South and East Asian pattern of kin and gender 
relations (Dyson and Moore 1983:fn 59).   
 
 Dyson and Moore posit two ideal-types (the Aryan, North Indian model and the 
Dravidian, South Indian model) in which the South Indian model is drawn in contrast to 
the North Indian model.   The latter is characterised by village and kin exogamy, in-
marrying women are considered a threat to the family resulting in the segregation of the 
sexes, conjugal reserve and the domination of young women by senior women.  There is 
an emphasis on the wedding ceremony and size of dowry, restrictions on female 
mobility and work and women do not inherit or transfer property.  South Indian 
marriage is characterised as village and kin endogamous, resulting in closer relations 
between spouses, less conflicts between a woman and her husband's family (for they are 
her own family), the underplaying (even dropping) of the wedding, bridewealth, less 
restrictions on women's occupational choice and, as there is `less need to repress and 
resocialize females in their affinal home', fewer joint families (Dyson & Moore 
1983:45).  In addition, women in the south may inherit or transfer property (ibid).  
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Dyson and Moore argue that these two models reflect typical cultural patterns 
generating observable differences in demographic performance and female autonomy in 
North and South India. 
 
 Alongside championing the two models Dyson and Moore recognise several 
limitations to their schema.  They acknowledge that there is no unequivocal distinction 
in demographic performance and female autonomy across the two regions, that the 
differences which can be identified are not only relative but `subtle' (ibid fn 31), and in 
some instances even `slight' (ibid p41).  They concede that adherence to the model 
varies by caste and class, a statement which undermines their racial-cultural arguments. 
 They also concede that the state level statistics on which they base their argument could 
be obscuring quite different relationships between demographic performance and 
female autonomy. The latter reservation is well founded for district level statistics for 
Tamil Nadu (which show no consistent correlation between high female literacy and 
low fertility) do not support Dyson and Moore's argument that the higher rate of female 
literacy in South India reflects the southern kin pattern's promotion of  female 
autonomy, higher contraception and lower fertility (Swaminathan 1996).   
 
 Dyson and Moore's schema denies the continuities between marriage patterns in 
North and South India despite bridewealth being a feature of North Indian marriage 
amongst impoverished higher castes,  lower castes and in more remote districts (Sharma 
1980:137-143; Sax 1991:104-115).  Sax states that the widespread shift to dowry began 
in the 1960s in North India.  Kapadia saw a similar shift occurring amongst upwardly 
mobile lower castes in rural South India in the 1980s, a shift which had already taken 
place amongst wealthy upper castes in the 1960s (Kapadia 1995:46-67; see also 
Viramma et al 1997:15-28).  The widespread view, implied in Dyson and Moore's work 
but more explicitly stated by Trautmann, is that in North India marriage results in the 
`complete dissimilation of the bride from her family of birth and her complete 
assimilation to that of her husband' (Trautmann 1981:291) which leaves her more 
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vulnerable in her conjugal home as compared with the South Indian woman.  Yet the 
life-long ritual links between brother and sister, gift-giving, and extended visiting which 
sustain close post-martial bonds between a woman and her natal kin in North India 
(Dube 1988; Vatuk 1975; Jacobson 1977) belie the patrilineal ideology to which 
Trautmann refers.  Further, Raheja and Gold (1994) find that where links between 
people can be traced through both marriage and birth (including coming from 
neighbouring villages) the discourse that `natal ties can never be supplanted by conjugal 
ones, that even genealogically very distant natal ties are really "closer" than any ties to 
the husband's kin' (1994:116) also operates.  Rather than a defining feature of  kin and 
gender relations in North India the patrilineal ideology of complete assimilation to the 
husband's family is better seen as a strategic tool in shaping power relations within 
families (see Jeffery et al 1989:31-36; Sax 1991:77-78).  Similarly, rather than 
disjunctive attitudes to female employment in North and South India there are 
continuities between the kinds of restriction on occupational choice that women in 
North and South India experience (cf Sharma 1980 with Lessinger 1989, Ram 1991 and 
Vera-Sanso 1995).   
 
 It is, however, true that marriage preferences in South India are distinctly 
different to those of the north where kin endogamous marriages are usually prohibited 
and the preference is for long distance marriage.  In the south there is a strong 
preference for marriages between specific genealogically related persons (MyB:eZD, 
FZS:MBD, MBS: FZD).  A bride's mother-in-law could be her maternal grandmother 
(MyB:eZD marriage) or her paternal aunt (FZS:MBD marriage) or she could be her aunt 
by marriage (MBS:FZD marriage).  It is often assumed by academics that these forms of 
marriage put daughters-in-law in a more favourable position than their counterparts in 
North India.  However, it would be a mistake to presume that such marriages produce 
good mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relations for two reasons.  First, the economic 
interests of mothers-in-law/daughters-in-law may still conflict.  Second, because 
families have multiple social and economic ties natal families can be less willing to 
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support their daughters/sisters for fear of jeopardising kin relations (see also Kapadia 
1995:44-45).  The complexity of the relations involved can make daughters-in-law less 
willing to complain.  In Chennai, for example, women in matrilateral marriages often 
hide unhappy domestic relations from their natal families in order to protect their 
mothers from emotional distress and, where their fathers had proposed a patrilateral 
marriage, from recriminations or beatings.  Thus even close-kin endogamous marriage 
does not ensure good mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relations nor realisable natal 
support for brides. 
   
 Despite marriage preferences most marriages are not arranged between kin and 
nor are they village endogamous.  Several studies have found that MyB:eZD marriage, 
FZS:MBD marriage and MBS:FZD marriages amount to a third or less of all marriages 
and are on the decline (Beck 1972:238, 253; Trautmann 1981:218-9; Good 1991:75-96; 
Kapadia 1995:61-66; Caldwell et al 1988:86).  Not only are most women not 
genealogically related to their mothers-in-law but marriages with less closely related kin 
do little to raise the overall rate of kin endogamous marriage (Trautmann 1981: 220-
221).  In practice, marriages are shaped more by economic and demographic factors 
than cultural ones.  The availability of  a marriageable relative of the appropriate age is 
merely one factor.  Beck (1972:252) finds that wealthy and poor families marry 
outsiders more often than do others either because they are cutting off poorer relatives 
or being cut off.  Tight intermarriage is more common amongst households of middle 
income status which have special inherited rights they wish to preserve (ibid).  Similarly 
Beck finds that village endogamy is related to the demographic spread of castes, 
availability of work for service castes and whether a family is seeking support to 
maintain local rights and privileges (ibid: 230-232).  She finds that only 6% of 
marriages are village endogamous, and for the smaller castes upwards of 40% of 
marriages are contracted between families living over 20 miles apart (ibid; see also 
Harriss 1982:138-146).  In the two low-income settlements I studied in Chennai only a 
small minority of women are married to relatives or to men from the same locality.  
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Contrary to the South Indian stereotype the majority of mothers-in-law and daughters-
in-law do not benefit from the potentials of kin endogamous marriage and, in the 
context of virilocal residence, the area to which brides move is often not well-known to 
them either.   
 
 The features which are said to strengthen the position of South Indian women 
also hold for North India.  Thus in both North and South India women have rights in 
their natal families which can strengthen their position in their conjugal families.  They 
have rights to economic transfers on ritual occasions (Jeffery et al 1989:26-27; Vatuk 
1975),  rights to extended visits with their natal family (Jacobson 1977) and the right to 
return home permanently after widowhood or desertion.   The one right which may be 
unique to South India is the right to return home for the first confinement (cf Jeffery et 
al 1989:72-74).  We need more evidence to accept that women in the south are 
systematically more able to exercise their rights than those in the north.  Rather than 
regional differences it more likely that class, demography and property tenure determine 
women's ability to realise their rights.  In Chennai's low-income settlements, for 
example, a woman's right to take up residence in her natal home after widowhood or a 
failed marriage is only realisable in rented accommodation or, in the case of property 
treated as inheritable, during the limited  period before all her brothers have married, 
after this time her sisters-in-law will prevent her permanent return (Vera-Sanso 1997).    
 
 Rather than cultural differences, it is social and economic positioning in 
conjunction with family demographics which shapes mother-in-law/daughter-in-law 
relations.  Fears and expectations of old-age dependency are what condition a woman's 
strategies towards her sons and daughters-in-law.   In households where livelihoods and 
unpaid work depend on the labour of family members, ageing women must develop 
strategies to ensure someone will undertake both the physical and economic support 
they and their husbands will need in old age.  Where old age without the support of an 
adult son results in serious hardship (see Cain 1988) and where sons set up nuclear 
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family households after a few years of marriage a woman's strategies towards her sons 
and daughters-in-law will reflect her perception of her own and their current and future 
circumstances.  Although early partition does not necessarily mean that in old age 
couples are completely abandoned nor that ageing mothers will not eventually be taken 
in by a married son, such arrangements can flavour domestic relations quite differently 
from those in which a young couple remain in or move into their parent's home (Vatuk 
1982:37).  Caldwell et al (1988:128) find that although in practice the majority of 
women in the South Indian state of Karnataka have their youngest son's family living 
with them, it is usually the son and daughter-in-law `who feel the need for separation 
less urgently' that live with her.  This lack of formality regarding who has responsibility 
for an ageing mother introduces not only a degree of insecurity regarding who will care 
for her but also the possibility that no son will actually house her.  Quality of care is also 
a concern in old age and evidence from South India points to a degree of intra-family 
neglect in even better off households (Gillespie and McNeill 1992:98).  Although not all 
ageing women without supporting sons suffer penury and not all ageing people living 
with married sons experience hostility or intra-family neglect  this occurs sufficiently 
often to create anxiety in mothers-in-law (see Vatuk 1995). 
 
Mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law in Chennai 
 If one accepts that mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relations are shaped by social 
and economic positioning claims that in rural Tamil Nadu daughters-in-law submit to 
the wishes of their mothers-in-law cannot, in the light of the enormous changes which 
have taken place in the rural economy, be taken at face value (Athreya et al 1987; 
Kapadia 1995; cf Harriss 1982).  While it may be that in many rural households 
daughters-in-law do not submit to the demands of their mothers-in-law, the basis of 
their relations differs from those in urban areas. The main difference lies in the greater 
degree of caste-based segregation in rural residential and occupational patterns.  In 
villages younger men and women benefit from their parents' and in-law's expertise and 
networks for training and gaining access to housing, work and other resources.   By 
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contrast cities are much more heterogeneous and can provide a greater range of 
opportunities for work, residence and independent networks for the younger generation. 
 Even at the local residential level, such as the low-income settlements studied in 
Chennai, cities are frequently heterogeneous in terms of caste and occupation and the 
older generation's knowledge and contacts are less significant for the younger 
generation.  This is exacerbated by three trends: first, the greater education of sons and 
daughters-in-law as compared with their parents and in-laws, many of whom are 
illiterate; second, increased age at marriage for men and women and third, the vast 
majority of urban men establish independent livelihoods before marriage.  
Consequently, sons and daughters-in-law feel more confident and independent of the 
older generation.  In villages the co-operative conflicts that exists between landpoor and 
landless mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law are rooted in extremely low and uncertain 
incomes.
4
  While this is still the case in Chennai's low-income settlements there is the 
additional, and considerable, pressure for upward mobility characteristic of cities which 
places demands on a family's income that can drive a wedge between the interests of 
mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law.  Government jobs, english-medium education, 
extra tuition, good marriages, improved housing materials, and electrification are all 
sought after and all require money.  This pressure to `come up in life' sharpens the co-
operative conflicts between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law.  
 
 Evidence for the relative independence of sons and daughters-in-law can be 
found by examining household structure (see Table 1).  In Chennai, household structure 
is heavily conditioned by tenure; in this case rented or `owned'.  The land I have classed 
as `owned' includes government-allotted plots, for which land titles are being or have 
been obtained, and squatted land.  As there is no legal title, squatted land (and the 
housing built upon it) cannot be legally inherited, however, the issue of transfer after the 
death of the occupants remains.  In popular thinking squatted property is treated as self-
acquired (as opposed to property inherited from a coparcener) and can be disposed of 
freely.  Unlike property which is legally owned, however, there is no authority which 
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can arbitrate between those claiming inheritance to squatted property.  In practice the 
occupants' acceptance of a family setting up an independent household on squatted 
property, rent free, signifies inheritance rights.  Claimants defend their interest by 
preventing others setting up independent households on the site.     
 
  Table 1 : Household structure (n=110) 
Household structure          No. of              Rented     `Owned' 
                                   households        housing             housing     
Compound households  26           6    20 
Joint households             15           9      6 
Extended households          14         12      2  
Nuclear households     36         29      7 
Female-headed households   8           6      2 
Single-women households     4           3      1 
Couple                       4                  4                        - 
Polygynous households   3                  2                  1 
 
 Compound households are defined here as those in which two or more families 
share a common residence but cook and budget separately.  In squatter settlements and 
government-allotted plots this usually entails a physical subdivision of the house site.  
Joint households comprise two or more families living, cooking and budgeting together. 
Nuclear families are defined as a couple with unmarried children.  Extended households 
comprise a couple or nuclear family supplemented by one or more people who 
themselves do not form a family, all of whom live, cook and budget together.  The 
polygynous households occur where one man marries two sisters.  We can see from 
Table 1 that nearly 56% of households are either nuclear or compound and that 
compound households predominate in `owned' housing.  If we were to classify only in 
terms of separate cooking and budgeting (which is the basis on which local 
classifications are made) the number of nuclear households is considerably higher as 
each compound household encompasses at least one nuclear household.  Classifying 
these households as nuclear would obscure important dynamics in the relations between 
the older and younger generations.   The household trajectory in `owned' housing is 
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usually as follows.  After marriage a son and his wife form a joint household with his 
parents' household until one or more of his children are weaned, at which time the 
property is subdivided allowing them independent cooking and budgeting.  In some 
families married daughters are also given a share of `owned' property.  Eventually all 
sons are married and living independently leaving their parents living, cooking and 
budgeting as a couple.  In most instances the ageing father dies before his wife and she 
remains on her own as a single-person household in her section of the property.  Thus of 
the 20 compound households in `owned' property 45% include the separately cooking 
and budgeting households of either ageing couples or ageing women.  A truncated 
trajectory occurs in rented housing.  Here the property is not subdivided so once 
children are weaned married sons move away and find their own housing and all 
daughters join their husbands on marriage  (although they may return to form a 
compound household if they fall out with their in-laws).  This leaves ageing couples and 
ageing women without the physical and financial help which they stand a better chance 
of obtaining when sons and daughters live `next door' as occurs in compound 
households.      
 
 A critical issue for the long-term residential security and welfare of  ageing 
women is who is living with whom.  If daughters-in-law or married daughters are living 
on the older woman's property the latter has security of residence.  As giving property to 
a daughter is considered exceptionally generous ageing women can expect physical and 
material assistance when it is needed.  If, on the other hand, a mother-in-law joins her 
son and daughter-in-law's household her access to household resources and care in older 
age is less certain.  Where deserted or widowed women (and their families) join their 
married daughter's household they do so either as `paying guests' or `temporary, self-
supporting' additions to the family.  These statuses effectively curtail their rights even 
where in practice ageing mothers may not be entirely self-supporting and may reside 
with daughters for many years.
5
  Such statuses serve to safeguard the reputation and 
masculinity of the son-in-law for whom the permanent arrival of a dependent mother-in-
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law threatens to mark him out as hen-pecked.  Hence mothers living with their 
daughters are usually in a precarious position for they have no right to being housed or 
to household resources.  Instead they are reliant on maintaining good relations with their 
son-in-law as he has the right and authority to demand that they leave.   
 
 
Table 2: Patterns of co-residence: 
 mother/daughter; mother-in-law/daughter-in-law 
(n =55) 
                                                                                 no. of households 
Older women taken in by younger women                                  12 
    -  mothers-in-law living with daughters-in-law                          3 
    -  mothers living with daughters                                              9 
Younger women taken in by older women                                   43 
    -  daughters living with mothers                                             16 
    -  daughters-in-law living with mothers-in-law                         27 
 
 
  In fifty-five of the 110 households studied in Chennai older women and younger 
married, widowed or deserted women co-reside.  Table 2 depicts the incidence of 
mother/daughter and mother-in-law/daughter-in-law co-residence across the 110 
households studied. `Daughters' refers to daughters who are or have been married.  The 
table does not give the total number of older and younger women co-residing as some 
households will contain more than one younger woman standing in the same 
relationship to the older woman.  We can see from the table that the younger generation 
of women are over three and a half times more likely to be living with the older 
generation than the reverse and that women are three times more likely to allow their 
mothers to join them than their mothers-in-law.  It is worth repeating, however, that 
mothers taken in by their daughters lack residential security and must, at the very least, 
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be seen to be self-supporting.  The long term prospects of women dependent on their 
own labour, or the generosity of others, relies on them maintaining good relations with, 
in the first instance, their daughters-in-law and, in the second, their sons-in-law.  While 
the likelihood of a woman having her daughter or daughter-in-law living with her is 
three times greater if she has squatted land or government-allotted land than rented 
housing, in practice it is nearly three times more likely that person will be her daughter-
in-law rather than her daughter.  This reflects differentials in property inheritance 
between sons and daughters.  With most married daughters moving away and the 
general opposition to married daughters giving money to their mothers, the majority of 
older women must rely on maintaining good relations with at least one daughter-in-law. 
 
 While the foregoing is suggestive of the relationship between property and 
trends in the care of  ageing women it gives little indication of the movement in co-
operative conflicts between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law.  The emphasis on 
female modesty and semi-seclusion for young wives underlies a daughter-in-law's initial 
dependence on her mother-in-law.  The latter preserves her daughter-in-law's reputation 
by being there to supervise her within the home, chaperoning her outside it and taking 
on much of the `outside work' such as the daily shopping and taking infants to school.
6
  
The importance of this role is exemplified by one daughter-in-law who returned to her 
mother's house in protest after her mother-in-law, who had suddenly fallen ill, asked her 
to fetch medicine late one night.  Other than this daughters-in-law have little 
dependence on mothers-in-law.  As most husbands do work and support their families 
in the early stages of marriage young women are not dependent on their mothers-in-law 
for childcare while they work.
7
  It is only some time after the birth of children that wives 
are forced out to work by men withholding significant sums of money for their own 
expenses.  By then most couples have moved out of the mother-in-law's home.  Indeed, 
if a son fails to support his conjugal family and is living off his parents they soon ask 
them to move out, as happened to Nagamma, a young Adi-Dravida women of 33 with 
three children.    
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Nagamma : `At the beginning we lived with my mother-in-law but because my husband 
was not earning much they asked us to leave.  They had been feeding us until 
then.  After we moved he would get painting jobs irregularly but spent the 
money on drink.  From that time only I started working.' 
 
 The situation of mothers-in-law is more complex.  Their older age enables them 
to undertake the most lucrative forms of self-employment not considered suitable to 
younger women.  While the latter tend to be restricted to trading from home or within 
their settlement and getting their stock from local retail outlets, older women have less 
constraints on their mobility and can, therefore, earn greater profits.
8
  However, in the 
long term their incomes decline as they become too weak to travel and they too must 
compete in the low profit, low turnover markets located within the settlements to which 
the younger women are confined.  Due to the long hours involved in earning even small 
incomes and the heavy, labour-intensive and inflexible nature of domestic tasks in low-
income settlements most mothers-in-law dread being abandoned by their sons.  They 
fear their sons will eventually `go behind their wives', that is, do as their wives wish and 
set up a separate household. 
 
 Whether ageing mothers-in-law are left vulnerable by sons setting up a separate 
household largely depends on two factors: the number of sons and the amount of  
squatted or government-allotted land the family has. 
 
Some families have enough land to 
build single-roomed homes for several sons while others have only enough room for 
two single-roomed homes.
 9
  If ageing mothers-in-law live on subdivided property on 
which more than one married son lives, they are generally cared for both physically and 
economically although they usually continue to work.  In these circumstances, as the 
cost of maintaining the mother-in-law, both in terms of money and labour, is shared 
between the sub-units of the compound household she is considered less of a burden 
and tensions between individuals can be tempered by others.   
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 Where ageing mothers-in-law share land with only one son's family they do not 
obtain physical or economic help from their son or daughter-in-law but must support 
themselves on their own, usually meagre, incomes.  While intra-family neglect is 
difficult to assess it is striking that in families where ageing mothers-in-law share the 
property with more than one son their dwelling is well maintained.  However where 
they share property with only one son's family their home is often best described as a 
tumbled-down shack while their son's home is not only well maintained but is 
frequently being improved.  Almost all ageing mothers-in-law who share property with 
one son's family suffer from considerable verbal (and in some cases physical) abuse 
from the son and possibly the daughter-in-law.  In a few instances these tensions arise 
because the mothers-in-law refuse to participate in their son's household as they 
disapprove of his marriage or consensual union.  In other cases, where the original 
reason for the household breaking into two is not exceptional, current difficulties are 
sustained by sons expecting their working mothers to hand over what the sons deem to 
be surplus income.  To quote from an elderly informant squatting on a small piece of 
land on which only one of her three sons are living: 
Jellammal :  `When my husband was alive I didn't have to work and we lived separately 
from the rest of the family.  My son never used to beat me when my husband was 
there.  My husband and son used to argue.  They were both drunkards.  I don't 
know what they argued about.  My daughter-in-law and I weren't speaking then 
either.  Now I have to work and my daughter helps me out with money.  Her 
husband is my [maternal] aunt's son so he doesn't mind.  Nobody else gives me 
anything.  Now my daughter-in-law tells my son `your mother gives money to 
her daughter' so he shouts and beats me without checking.' 
Elderly working women in single-person households also report that married daughters 
expect to be given food or money.  Clearly, elderly women's needs are considered to be 
few and easily met by the incomes they earn.  Similarly elderly couples are thought to 
have few wants and are able to earn an adequate income.  This reinforces their 
vulnerability and isolation and is portentous of intra-household resource distributions if 
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they receive support when they can no longer look after themselves.   
 
 For the large number of mothers-in-law living in rented accommodation the 
prospect of their sons `going behind their wives' is not only very distressing but a strong 
likelihood.  This reflects the comparatively low pressure on housing in Chennai and the 
low market value attached to the illegal transfer of municipal tenements.  Kamala is an 
elderly Mudaliar widow who has one son and lives in a rented room.  Since her 
husband's death she has been a housemaid but is now too weak to continue. 
Kamala :`I have a meals shop.  I sell curry, fish and rice which I cook at home and then 
take to the pavement near Lakshmi Nagar. Because I am selling food my son 
and daughter-in-law don't want to keep me.  They don't like it because I have to 
wash other people's plates and my son's friends see me doing this business.
10
  
They feel insulted that I do this work but they don't want to feed me instead.  
(Crying) My daughter-in-law is not willing to live with my son if I am there.   
She wants to live separately.  She moved back to her mother's house.  My son is 
following her.  He wants a separate house.' 
 
 For elderly women living alone, or indeed with an abusive son, is particularly 
difficult because they are not surrounded by relatives and caste members, as they would 
be in a village, and therefore are less able to appeal to others for physical, moral or even 
jural support (for example see Kapadia 1995:171-174, but cf Mencher 1989:140).  It 
also means that just at the time when their incomes are lowest they have to pay 
neighbouring children to fetch water and carry the heavy and cumbersome subsidised 
groceries on which the poor rely, thereby reducing their ability to pay for food and 
medicines.   
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 Faced with these grim prospects mothers-in-law living in rented accommodation 
or on small squatted and government-allotted plots try to appease their daughters-in-
law, using several strategies to keep their daughters-in-law compliant. The most 
common of which occurs in joint households which include the groom's unmarried 
siblings.   Fearing that daughters-in-law will resent taking on the full burden of what 
they see as two families' domestic labour and thus force a split, mothers-in-law tend to 
undertake considerably more of the `heavy' and demeaning tasks (washing, sweeping, 
cleaning toilets) than is usually done by a mother-in-law.
11
   One of the major causes of 
the move from joint budgeting under the control of the mother-in-law to separate 
budgeting under either the control of the son or daughter-in-law is disputes over how 
much of the son's income should be put into the common household fund and how that 
fund is spent.  Hence a common strategy is the stricter control of the joint domestic 
budget once daughters-in-law join the household so that they cannot accuse their 
mothers-in-law of `needlessly' spending the groom's contribution on `personal 
expenses'.  This can create a very disturbing situation for mothers-in-law as these 
`personal expenses' inevitably comprise financial assistance to distressed female 
relatives, usually married daughters.   From the daughter-in-law's point of view this 
represents a misappropriation of household resources in order to satisfy the individual 
emotional needs of her mother-in-law.  We have already seen from Jellammal's case that 
sons and daughters-in-law not only consider that married daughters should not receive 
money from the common household fund but parental income, even if they live in a 
separate household, should come to a son rather than a married daughter.   
   
 Women have two further strategies which they can employ to secure their long-
term future.  One is to arrange a cross-kin marriage for a son or a daughter in the hope 
that the daughter-in-law or son-in-law will be willing to provide physical and financial 
support.  While, by convention a son-in-law does not support a mother-in-law, he is 
expected to do so if she is his actual or classificatory sister.  The second strategy is to 
give some land to another relative, most commonly a daughter.  This strategy virtually 
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guarantees, but usually reflects, poor relations with a son and daughter-in-law.  The 
degree to which people consciously distribute property to safeguard their future can be 
seen in the following frank statement. 
Nalini  : `I owed money and had to sell my tenement flat.  I don't trust my sons to look 
after me so I sold it to my niece for a very low price.  If I am sick [incontinent] 
during my old age my niece will have to wash my clothes.  I know she will do 
this for me and her husband will feed [pay for] me.' 
Although tenement flats do not have a high exchange value in Chennai, Nalini hopes 
that transferring her flat at well below market value will be treated as an exceptionally 
generous gesture and will secure her future.
12
  Similarly parents or mothers who give 
land to their daughter expect their daughter's assistance in old age as well as their son-
in-law to turn a blind eye to food transfers. 
 
 The co-operative conflicts between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law living 
in low-income settlements in Chennai reflect the greater opportunities for residential 
and financial independence for young families that cities provide while at the same time 
increasing their aspirations and the demands on their income.  Although semi-seclusion 
imposes constraints which make brides initially dependent on mothers-in-law, 
daughters-in-law have little long-term interest in remaining on good terms with their 
mother-in-law.  Consequently, mothers-in-law undertake various strategies to maintain 
more encompassing households and make the mother-in-law/daughter-in-law 
relationship less onerous to daughters-in-law.  The degree to which women need to do 
this is conditioned by the size of land they control, the number of sons they have and 
their expectations of their sons-in-law and (to a lesser extent) other kin.  Those with 
larger pieces of land which are subdivided between several offspring fare significantly 
better than those without land, with a small piece of land or only one son. 
 
Conclusion 
 The predominant image of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relations in India 
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is drawn from the particular circumstances of landed rural families and does not 
accurately reflect mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relations amongst those living on low-
incomes in urban South India.  As the economic circumstances and opportunities for the 
younger generation changes with migration and urban employment it is questionable to 
what extent the dominant image is generally applicable to landed families.  It is unlikely 
to hold for landless rural families.  Instead the quality of mother-in-law/daughter-in-law 
relations reflects their comparative interest in the relationship which, in turn, depends on 
the control of property (whether legally held or squatted) as well as their relative 
positions and sources of support within the family, local community and labour market. 
These comparative interests vary over time because their position and sources of 
support both within and beyond the family are not fixed but changing.   In the long-
term, however, all mothers-in-law face a degree of vulnerability, although that degree 
widens the more a woman, and her husband, are dependent on earned income.  In the 
heterogeneous low-income settlements of Chennai mothers-in-law have few economic 
11and social resources on which daughters-in-law depend beyond the early years of 
semi-seclusion.  In addition, there is considerable demand on household resources 
which can increase the resentment of daughters-in-law towards their mother-in-law.  As 
sons are usually given priority in property rights it is only those older women who have 
land on which more than one married son can and is likely to set up a home that a 
mother-in-law is in a strong position vis-a-vis her daughter-in-law.  However, as land is 
further subdivided it will be increasingly less possible to accommodate more than one 
son's family.  In these circumstances the numbers of mothers-in-law adopting strategies 
of co-operation or even appeasement towards their daughters-in-law will increase.   
 
 On the basis of the evidence from Chennai we can see that mother-in-
law/daughter-in-law relations are extremely complex, diverse and changing.  We can 
also see from more recent research that the North Indian and South Indian models have 
emphasised abstract kinship patterns at the expense of actual kin relations, social and 
economic positioning and family demographics.  Such an approach to culture, as well as 
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a greater empathy with brides than with mothers-in-law and the priority given to inter-
gender relations in family studies, has inhibited anthropologists' exploration of the 
mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relationship both in and beyond India.  More research is 
needed into mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relations to consider the long and short 
term impact of changes in production, urbanisation and lowered fertility as well as the 
pressures towards upward mobility and increased consumption levels.  Ironically, in the 
long term, a daughter-in-law's pursuit of upward mobility, lowered fertility and good 
jobs for her own sons may further increase the latter's independence and her own 
vulnerability in old age.  If, as is demonstrated for low-income households in Chennai, 
intra-gender, inter-generational household relations are not static and improvements in 
the circumstances or opportunities of one generation in a family may be detrimental to 
another, there is an urgent need to investigate which economic and social developments 
have a deleterious effect on older women's (and, indeed, older men's) capacity to 
support themselves or to secure the support of their family.         
 
 
 
   NOTES 
 
 This article is dedicated to the many women who opened their hearts to me 
despite the difficulties it might cause with their daughters-in-law.  I thank Joan Mencher 
and Judith Heyer for generously drawing comparisons with their own unpublished data 
and, along with Barbara Harriss-White, Nandini Gooptu, John Harriss, Peter Parkes, 
Simon Harrison and two anonymous reviewers, for their helpful comments and 
suggestions on earlier drafts.  Funding for fieldwork was provided by the University of 
London's Central Research Grant and Postgraduate Studentship Fund and the Royal 
Anthropological Institute's Emslie-Horniman award. 
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1. The Hindu Succession Act (1956) only gives wives and daughters rights of 
inheritance in cases of intestacy.  Frequently even these rights are not upheld 
(see Parry 1979:169-171; Agarwal 1998). 
 
2. Although some states have extended the status of coparceners to widows or 
daughters they frequently forego their right to property (Agarwal 1998:15). 
 
4. In societies without a standard retirement age `old age' must be used as a 
relative term connotating local, and often contested, assessments of physical 
abilities and needs.  For example, while employers may consider a woman as 
unemployably old  her family may not yet feel she needs much, if any, 
physical or economic support.  Such women are forced into the low profit, low 
turnover end of self-employment in the informal sector (Vera-Sanso 1995).  
For this reason I have largely used the term `ageing' rather than old and 
reserved the term `elderly' for specific instances where I wish to convey a 
sense of  frailty or disability resulting from the ageing process. 
     
5 Co-operative conflict refers to the shifting balance of interests partners to an 
association have in maintaining that association.  The question in relation to 
domestic groups is why do people maintain their association despite often 
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glaring inequalities.   Instead of seeing domestic inequalities as rooted in 
culturally-based biases in perception of needs and contributions, as Sen (1990) 
does, they are better seen as the outcome of struggles over meaning and 
identity (Hart 1992; Vera-Sanso 1994).  
    
5. See Vera-Sanso (1997) on differential rights in households. 
6. Drinking water, for instance, is usually only available at a public pump 
sometime between the hours of 2am-5am and a mother-in-law's chaperonage is 
vital.  Without chaperonage a young woman would not only be inviting 
malicious gossip but would be exposing herself to sexual harassment. 
 
7. The labour force participation rate for women in Chennai is 8.4% compared to 
29.9% for the state as a whole (Census Handbook 1991:52-53). 
8. See Vera-Sanso (1995) on cultural and economic constraints on female labour 
participation and incomes in Chennai. 
 
9. Since the 1960s many government-allotted plots have been repeatedly 
subdivided  and frequently sold making it impossible for several sons to build 
separate one-roomed homes on the plot. 
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10. As people in Tamil Nadu eat with their hands washing plates necessitates 
contact with saliva which is considered polluting. 
 
11. Contrast this with what an elderly woman sharing a large squatted plot with 
several sons says of her daughter-in-law:  
  `I am not speaking with my first daughter-in-law.  The house doesn't 
have proper drainage and she asked ME to remove the sewage!' 
 
12. Sharma (1980:56) reports a similar strategy in North West India. 
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